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From Modern to Postmodern Penality? A Response to Hallsworth 
 
Abstract 
In a recent article, Hallsworth (2002) seeks to defend the claim that 
contemporary changes in penal practice indicate the rise of a postmodern penality.  
Hallsworth proposes that the modern-postmodern distinction is both a legitimate and 
valuable framework within which to situate recent developments in penal practice. In 
this paper, we argue that Hallsworth has several questions yet to answer before he can 
sustain claims for a postmodern penality and for the modern-postmodern distinction 
as the most useful analytical framework for analysing this transition.  We identify 
three issues raised by Hallworth’s argument, encompassing methodological, empirical 
and conceptual questions. We argue that his approach exhibits some methodological 
problems, especially in respect of his use of an ‘ideal type’ method; that there are 
important empirical gaps in his account, in that he fails to deal adequately with 
counter-factual evidence; and that his account exhibits a conceptual conflation 
between ‘postmodernity’ as a social formation and ‘postmodernism’ as an anti-
foundational epistemology for social inquiry. Given these methodological, empirical 
and conceptual lacunae, we suggest that a convincing case for a ‘postmodern penality’ 





From Modern to Postmodern Penality? A Response to Hallsworth 
 
Introduction 
In a recent article, Hallsworth (2002) seeks to defend the claim that contemporary 
changes in penal practice indicate the rise of a postmodern penality.  Against theorists 
such as Garland, Lucken, and O’Malley, Hallsworth proposes that the modern-
postmodern distinction is both a legitimate and valuable framework within which to 
situate recent developments in penal practice. This contribution situates Hallsworth 
within a longstanding debate over how to understand contemporary social change.  
Are we modern?  Or are we postmodern? Are we both, or are we neither?  This debate 
ranges across several disciplines and raises several questions concerning the use of 
empirical data and the epistemological basis of its interpretation.  In this paper, we 
argue that Hallsworth has several questions yet to answer before he can sustain claims 
for a postmodern penality and for the modern-postmodern distinction as the most 
useful analytical framework for analysing this transition.  Indeed, the juxtaposition of 
these claims itself raises an important problem for Hallswoth’s analysis.  Here, we 
identify three issues raised by Hallworth’s argument, encompassing methodological, 
empirical and conceptual questions.  We deal with each of these in turn.   
In the first section we discuss methodological issues related to the use of ideal-
typical models, in this case the model of modern penal systems developed by 
Hallsworth. We argue that Hallsworth’s account displays a crucial slippage between 
the phenomena about which he is supposedly making generalisations (modern penal 
systems) and representations of that phenomena (rhetorical discourses about penal 
practice). We suggest that this is an error all to frequent amongst those engaging in 
‘postmodern’ social analysis, where  ‘text’ is conflated with the extant socio-material 
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realities of actual practices. The second section deals with a problematic use of 
empirical data to support the case for a postmodern penality. Hallsworth charts certain 
trends in penal practice, many of which are significant in the USA, so that the USA 
appears to be in the vanguard of postmodern penality. However, we can identify at 
least four western societies in which these trends are not occurring. We note that 
models of capitalist social development vary tremendously, so that interpreting such 
trends requires engagement with counter-factual evidence in order for the analysis to 
carry explanatory weight.  At the same time, the evidence for a postmodern penality 
requires the imposition of a unity upon penal practices, which they do not in practice 
demonstrate.  A further difficulty arises in that the concept of the ‘postmodern’ 
appears so vague as to leave us wondering what, exactly, is post about penal trends.  
In the third and final section we raise the question of a problematic slippage in 
Hallsworth’s paper between a sociological analysis of ‘postmodernity’ as an object to 
be investigated, and a postmodern sociology. As Turner (1990), amongst others, has 
pointed out, a sociological approach to postmodernity locates the object of study 
within wider economic, political and cultural shifts, whereas a postmodern sociology 
deconstructs the foundational assumptions of modernist thought. By resting his case 
for a postmodern penality on supposed empirical trends in practice, Hallsworth 
appears to be engaging in the former.  However, drawing on Bataille to develop the 
analytical case places him in the latter category.  This leaves the argument in the 
unsustainable position of using an anti-foundational epistemology to support a 
foundational ontology.  In the conclusion we note that the various problems we raise 
bedevil many ‘post’ theories, and point to alternative interpretations which locate 
changing penal practices within the continuity of capitalist commodification. Overall, 
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we argue that the various questions we raise would have to be addressed in order to 
establish a plausible case for a postmodern penality. 
Methodological questions: reading off social reality from talk and text. 
The first problem relates to what might be viewed as a problematic application of 
Weber’s ‘ideal-type’ methodology. Hallsworth proceeds in a logical manner, first 
defining ‘penal modernity’ by means of developing ‘an ideal-typical model 
classifying the underlying principles around which they [i.e. modern penal systems] 
are organized’ (p.149). He identifies four principles underlying the emergence of 
‘penal modernity’, namely: the amelioration of pain delivery; equivalence in the 
allocation of penal sanctions; the organisation of penal regimes according to 
‘productive expenditure’; and statutory due process as the basis of judicial judgement. 
Taken together, these four principles are said to differentiate modern penality from its 
pre-modern precursor (pp.149-151). Drawing upon Georges Bataille, Hallsworth 
locates these four principles as symptomatic of a transition from a pre-modern 
‘general economy’ of excess to a modern ‘restricted economy’ of rational and 
balanced exchange. Having identified these key features (along with their underlying 
logic in the material and symbolic economy) Hallsworth then charts their relative 
marginalization or partial supercession by other principles, thereby establishing the 
case for an emerging ‘postmodern penality’. 
However, it must be recalled that the purpose of the ideal type is to furnish a 
pure or logical abstraction of a particular phenomenon (Weber’s familiar targets 
include ‘rational action’ and ‘bureaucracy’). However, it seems that in Hallswoth’s 
account there is a crucial slippage, such that the phenomenon about which he is 
making generalisations is other than it at first appears. He purports ‘to interpret the 
features of modern penal systems…the principles around which they are organised’ 
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(p.149 emphasis added). However, he immediately shifts the object of analysis (the 
phenomenon being subjected to typification) by instead examining the ‘self-image’ of 
penal modernity. That is to say, the ‘underlying principles’ he identifies are not 
generalisations about penal practices (the principles of social action), but the 
representations and rhetorical tropes with which modern philosophers, sociologists 
and visionaries built up an imaginary of a modern penality.  Hallsworth himself refers 
not only to ‘self-image’, but also to ‘utopias’ and ‘reveries’ (p.152).  The mapping of 
‘penal modernity’ with which we are presented amounts to an account of the 
ideological manifestos (and sometimes apologia) of ‘modern penality’, rather than the 
actual practices around which it might have been organised. 
 Hallsworth may, of course, respond that these ‘self-images’, ‘utopias’ and 
‘reveries’ furnished the blueprints that were put into action in the building and 
operation of modern penal institutions, thereby ensuring that the ‘rhetoric’ fairly 
captures the ‘reality’. Yet, if this is the claim, then Hallsworth leaves himself open to 
the accusation of ‘naïve idealism’ (in the philosophical sense) or ‘cultural 
determinism’, namely that he reads off the reality of social practices from the talk 
about those practices.  Because a judicious sampling of philosophers, social thinkers, 
political actors, etc. represented modern penal institutions as operating upon these 
principles (e.g. equivalence before the law, due process) in no way warrants the belief 
that such principles were necessarily actualised in penal practices. Hallsworth has 
here fallen prey to an error all to frequent amongst those propounding ‘postmodern’ 
social analysis, namely that of conflating ‘text’ with the extant socio-material realities 
of actual practices. As Bruno Latour (1993:66) reminds us, while the authors of the 
‘modern Constitution’ claim that this is/was an era of pure rationality, pure 
instrumentality, and pure calculation, ‘we must be careful not to take them at their 
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word...'. Rather, we need to be aware of the ‘several modernities’ (c.f.,Lash, 1999;  
Penna et al, 1999; McClintock, 1995) that co-exist historically and 
contemporaneously.  That is to say, ‘modernity’ has never been a uni-dimensional 
phenomenon, but encompasses several conflicting and contradictory logics, 
experiences and representations. The extent to which ‘penal modernity’ actually 
operated upon the principles specified by Hallsworth is a question for rigorous 
empirical-historical investigation, and cannot simply be assumed to be the case based 
upon a purported ‘self-image’ (indeed, invoking the notion of ‘self-image’ is a 
somewhat question-begging endeavour, in that it presupposes exactly what needs to 
be proved, namely that there existed a coherent entity called ‘penal modernity’ that 
could entertain an image of ‘itself’). 
If the existence of a coherent ‘penal modernity’ founded upon key organizing 
principles hasn’t been adequately established, what of the supposed transformations in 
penal practice that warrant a ‘postmodern’ appellation? Acknowledging the work of 
Garland and O’Malley, Hallsworth agrees that the chronic persistence of ‘high crime 
societies’ has resulted in contradictory and volatile responses. He, however, identifies 
three forms of response: the persistence of ‘modern’ (rehabilitative, correctional) 
projects; the continued rationalization and modernization of the penal order; and the 
rise of ‘postmodern penality’. The first thing to note here is that two of the three 
component trends are explicitly identified as modern – so should we assume that the 
current penal order is 2/3 modern and 1/3 postmodern? If the responses to penal crisis 
remain largely within the scope of Hallsworth’s own frame of ‘penal modernity’, then 
the thesis that we are seeing ‘an emergent postmodern penality’ has to be qualified to 
such an extent that its analytical value is greatly weakened.  
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Evidential questions: interpretation and the implications of counter-factuals 
Setting this aside for the moment, we can move on to a second problem that has both 
an empirical and conceptual dimension, which we discuss in turn. Let us examine the 
third, specifically ‘postmodern’ component of contemporary penal trends. Hallsworth 
claims that this trend comprises three developments: re-establishment of pain delivery 
as legitimate; ‘arbitrary and disproportionate sentencing’ as commonplace; and 
‘unproductive expenditure’ as a ‘dominant norm’. These are seen as symptomatic of a 
revived ‘general economy of excess’, as compared to the ‘restricted economy’ of 
rational exchange typical of modernity. These trends hence contrast with his 
aforementioned ‘principles of penal modernity’, thus justifying the claim that 
contemporary penality has a significant ‘postmodern’ component. 
Firstly, is there sufficient evidence to support the generalised rise of such 
penal practices? What Hallsworth furnishes, unfortunately, are numerous empirical 
generalisation which are stated rather baldly, with little in the way of elaboration or 
qualification. For example: ‘Punitive sanctions have significantly increased’; ‘western 
societies’ appetite for pain delivery has increased significantly’, and that prison 
populations in ‘western societies’ have undergone ‘unrelenting expansion’ (p.156). 
These are highly problematic claims. His examples of new (or revived) penal 
practices (such as chain gangs, ‘three strikes and out’ laws, expanding use of the death 
penalty) are all drawn from the USA, and there is no corroborating evidence cited 
from studies of European or other countries. Indeed, Hallsworth seems to suggest that 
the USA is the vanguard of ‘postmodern penality’, leading the way for other western 
societies. There is no acknowledgement that the proliferation of such penal initiatives 
in the USA might be the outcome of contextually-specific socio-economic, political 
and cultural factors, or evidence that other countries converge or diverge from the 
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American situation, in whole or in part. Rather, they are seen as subject to a general 
logic sweeping ‘western societies’ which can be read-off from its most ‘advanced’ 
instance.  
This is an obviously flawed approach. For example, while prison populations 
increased fivefold in the USA between 1970 and 1996, this trend hasn’t necessarily 
been mirrored in other western countries – thus, between 1985 and 1995 prison 
population (per 100,000) in Denmark and Ireland remained unchanged, while it fell in 
Germany and Austria (Taylor, 1999: 188). So, here we have four ‘western societies’ 
in which the ‘unrelenting expansion’ of incarceration appears not to have taken place! 
Does such counter-factual evidence not undermine the claim that there has been a 
generalised shift toward ‘pain-delivery’, ‘excess’ and ‘disproportionate sentencing’? 
Equally, behind the ‘tough on crime’ and ‘zero tolerance’ rhetoric of politicians, there 
is a much more complex reality, including continued investment and experimentation 
with community-based and integrative initiatives (see for example Reiner, 2000). 
There is a long-standing recognition in both academic and policy circles that models 
of (capitalist) social development vary tremendously, with a particular distinction 
made between the Anglo-American and European models (c.f., McGrew, 1992; 
Pinch, 1997).  The development of industrial societies displays different combinations 
of control, social integration, welfare provision, labour market strategies and so on, 
such that the social and political ‘steering mechanisms’ (Offe, 1984) that realise 
different models of social development display significant variations (Esping-
Andersen, 1990).  Currently, the European Union makes much of the distinction 
between a ‘social model of Europe’ (c.f., Larsson, 1998) which is opposed to an 
American model. 
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Moreover, we should note that not only do societal models of development 
vary, but the application of different penal strategies (liberal, illiberal, punitive, 
integrative, etc.) also varies crucially according to the social, economic and cultural 
classifications brought to bear on different populations – strategies for juvenile justice 
can vary significantly from those for ‘adult’ offenders; the response of penal 
institutions to men and women exhibit great divergences; the application of ‘arbitrary 
and disproportionate sentencing’ has long existed with reference to marginalised or 
stigmatised groups (e.g. those from minority ethnic groups, the working classes). The 
point here is that the deployment of different penal strategies must be contextualised 
in different and changing social, political and cultural contexts, policy frameworks 
and trajectories of national criminal justice systems – doing so enables us both to 
identify the crucial variations in penal practice across national contexts, and to 
hypothesise the different causal mechanisms contributing to them. To simply attribute 
them to the general rubric of an emergent ‘postmodern penality’ amounts to a non-
explanation, or one that levels different phenomena and their respective causes 
through an academic sleight-of-hand, imposing upon them a spurious descriptive 
unity. 
Secondly, the concept of the ‘postmodern’ appears to suffer a potentially fatal 
indeterminacy. What, exactly, is post about these penal trends? Hallsworth’s own 
account (drawing upon Bataille’s aforementioned distinction), sees the practices he 
identifies with ‘postmodern penality’ as a return of a pre-modern logic of excess, 
vengeance and spectacle. It is the ‘return of the repressed’. On this basis, recourse to 
these punitive endeavours is non-modern, a-modern, pre-modern, possibly anti-
modern – but is it post-modern in any meaningful sense? The picture is further 
confused in that Hallsworth acknowledges that these practices didn’t necessarily 
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disappear from ‘penal modernity’ – there was a ‘persistence of the excess economy 
that could easily at times be invoked’ and ‘the distinctly modern principles…could 
easily be revoked by turns in the penal pendulum’ (p.154). Given this concession, the 
obvious suggestion is that what we are currently witnessing is just such a partial 
evocation of the excessive economy of punishment, a partial revocation of modern 
principles. In other words, Hallsworth’s own concessions (both about the persistence 
of an excessive economy of punishment in ‘modernity’, and the current co-existence 
of excessive and ‘modern’ penal initiatives) suggests that what we are seeing at the 
moment is not significantly different from the complex oscillations between different 
penal forms that has long characterised the ‘modern’ era. It may be yet another ‘turn 
in the penal pendulum’, hence impossible to distinguish from previous evocations. 
There appears little in Hallsworth’s own account to warrant labelling these trends 
‘postmodern’. Perhaps the problem here in part arises from the fact that Hallsworth’s 
use of the term itself has limited analytical specificity or content. As we know, the 
term entertains very variable, and often contradictory, usage. The ‘postmodern’ has 
variously been defined in terms of the ‘death of the humanist subject’, ‘the explosion 
of difference or alterity’, the collapse of the distinction between ‘representation’ and 
‘reality’ in an age of mediated ‘simulacra’, and so on. Barring a reference to Lyotard’s 
socio-epistemological depiction of the ‘postmodern condition’ as an ‘incredulity to 
meta-narratives’ (or generalising and self-validating discourses of Truth), Hallsworth 
offers us no specification of what we ought to understand by the term. It seems, 
ultimately, to denote ‘something different’ from ‘modernity’, where modernity has 
already been evacuated of any inconvenient (a-rational, excessive) elements and 
turned into an abstraction against which it is also too easy to identify incompatible 
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phenomena in current penal practices.  We turn next to these and further conceptual 
problems arising from Hallworth's use of the term ‘postmodern’. 
 
Conceptual questions: a sociological analysis of postmodernity or a postmodern 
sociology? 
 
Thirdly and finally, we raise a highly problematic conceptual slippage between 
‘postmodern’ and ‘postmodernism’, in Hallsworth’s account. The terms 'modern' and 
'postmodern' are now commonplace in much contemporary social science but as we 
note above there is no agreement over their respective meanings and implications.  
The modern-postmodern dyad can be understood as a shorthand for an extensive 
series of debates about central concepts and perspectives in social theory generally.  
The debates range across a number of concepts: structure and agency, history, culture, 
subjectivity, public and private, identity, ethics and science, and more.  In this debate, 
the term 'postmodern' has come to symbolise a dispute in social science about 
personal and social change in the contemporary world.  Some commentators treat the 
postmodern as a distinct form of society or an historical period, others assert that the 
'post' is a part of the modern, while yet others claim the postmodern as an 
epistemological or theoretical rupture which signals a change both in social 
experience and in the cultural categories in which such experience is explained and 
understood (O’Brien and Penna, 1998).  In many instances, these different layers of 
meaning - historical, sociological and philosophical - are tangled together and lead to 
confusion about whether the debate refers to evidence of a transition to a post-modern 
era or to a clash of perspectives through which to theorise the modern era.   
 The confusion is common and, in part, illustrative of a confusion between a 
sociological analysis of 'postmodernity' as empirical trends, conditions, or phenomena 
- that is, as an object to be investigated - and a postmodern sociology.  A sociological 
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approach to postmodernity locates the object of study within wider economic, 
political and cultural shifts, whereas a postmodern sociology deconstructs the 
foundational assumptions of modernist thought (Turner, 1990).  This distinction is 
important, signifying either evidentially-based arguments or arguments over 
epistemology.  To propose that we are witnessing a shift to 'postmodernity' is to 
engage in a highly complex and disputed theoretical field.  ‘Postmodernity’ is a label 
that has been used to refer to contemporary changes in industrial, scientific, cultural 
and social organisation (c.f., Crook et al, 1992).  A postmodernisation thesis proposes 
that societies are undergoing a process of profound and foundational social change 
(Crook et al, 1992: 1).  The idea that contemporary social institutions, relationships 
and structures serve to reverse or invert modern patterns of everyday and institutional 
life is central to the argument that the postmodern represents an historical break with 
the modern.  A postmodernisation thesis (such as that proposed by Crook et. al.) is 
basically a systems analysis focusing on a perceived transition between a modern 
society with well-mapped characteristics and tendencies and an as yet-to-appear 
postmodern society whose contents and principles currently exist only as outline 
sketches.  In this way, a sociology of postmodernisation seeks to identify the 
important emergent trends of this transformation - the outlines of the new social order.   
This sort of account has much in common with systems theoretical 
approaches.  Its theory of social change is based on a concept of system self-
transformation, the connection between whose parts is indicative of the larger whole 
(O’Brien and Penna, 1998).  This construction is contested in ‘postmodernism’ -
postmodern social theory.  The latter is not a single academic or theoretical enterprise, 
but encompasses many different theories, drawing on an eclectic range of thinkers 
including Nietszche, Derrida, Kristeva, Lyotard and Lacan. Postmodernism, as a 
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theoretical exercise, comprises a political counterpoint to a sociology of 
postmodernism, as would any theoretical programme informed by Nietszche, who 
writes, for example: 
Against positivism, which halts at phenomena - "There are only facts" - I would say: No, facts are 
precisely what there is not, only interpretations.  We cannot establish any fact "in itself". (cited in 
Dickens and Fontana 1994: 7). 
 
The implication here is that there is no factual ground on which to base theory and 
practice - in other words, there are no factual grounds to distinguish true and false 
interpretations. Along with poststructuralist work, theories derived from these 
epistemological roots have led to the ‘anti-foundational turn’ in social theory.  The 
long tradition of social thought influenced by Nietzsche’s emphasis on the arbitrary 
character of grammatical structure underpins the deconstructive criticism associated 
with postmodernism (Kellner, 1989).   
 In Hallsworth’s account, at first glance we seem to be reading a sociological 
account of postmodernity, an account which locates penal practice, through a set of 
empirical claims, as evidence of a transitional shift (although not, as might be 
expected, connected to other shifts) from a modern to a postmodern penality.  
However, the theoretical argument which is used to buttress this claim is derived from 
Bataille, whose work is a sustained critique of modernity’s own self-understanding.  It 
is important to note that Bataille’s ouvre is squarely placed within the tradition of 
deconstructive criticism.  In particular, it is important to appreciate the context of 
Bataille’s work.  Writing from the early twentieth century and influenced by 
Nietzsche’s philosophy (as well as psychoanalysis and functional anthropology) 
Bataille provided an intervention in debates with just about all modernist thought 
including Christianity, humanism, evolutionism and Cartesian dualism, subjecting 
such thought to sustained interrogation (see Richardson, 1998).  During the 1930s this 
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critique extended to an engagement with theoretical Marxism, deconstructing, through 
a series of essays and polemics, the foundational concepts underpinning structural 
Marxism’s understanding of structure and agency.  The critique is, though, at the 
same time a critique of classical political economy and actual capitalist social 
relations with their basis in the accumulation imperative and the work ethic. 
A key concept in Bataille’s work is the ‘general economy’.  Against modernist 
representations of the capitalist economy based upon production, saving and utility, 
Bataille argues that, much more significant, is a general economy characterised by 
expenditure without return, waste, loss, disequilibrium, generosity, sacrifice and 
destruction (see for example, Bataille, 1988; 1985). Social agents or actors are 
understood as driven by excesses: of energies- fantasies, drives, needs and so on- in 
contrast with modernism’s rational-actor model, where the unveiling of false 
consciousness or liberation from pre-modern superstition will lead social actors to 
understand where their self-interest lies.  Rational actors are the stuff of modern social 
theory, a crucial premise of Enlightenment thought, along with evolutionary accounts 
of historical development. It is this modernist narrative that Bataille sought to 
challenge, through an emphasis on excess and expenditure, rather than utility and 
savings, on value articulated as excess, rather than calculatively.  In so doing, Bataille 
arguably provides an essentialist metaphysics of human being, in which human life is 
contradictory and paradoxical, humans irrational, with a propensity to disaccumulate, 
waste, and expend, thus resisting capitalist imperatives to accumulate and preserve.  
Whilst it is impossible here to do justice to Bataille’s wide-sweeping writings, it 
worth noting that much of this writing was aimed at modernist representations of 
social life so that, for example:  
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Mankind has the choice of loving nothing.  Because the universe without cause and without 
aim that brought it into being has not necessarily granted it an acceptable destiny.  But anyone 
frightened by human destiny, who cannot bear the sequence of greed, crimes and poverty, does not 
have the possibility of being virile…They can tolerate the existence that is their lot only on condition of 
forgetting what they really are.  Artists, politicians and scientists are appointed to lie to them.  
Therefore those who dominate existence are almost always the ones who know best how to lie to 
themselves, and, consequently, are best able to lie to others. (in Richardson, 1998:89-90) 
 
Modernity is represented through false foundational claims, false in the 
Nietzschean sense that language is unstable and foundational meaning impossible, 
false in the sense that along with Hegelian enlightenment exists profound depths of 
‘unknowability’, and false in the sense that key social actors whose representations 
are marked by authority, in fact, lie.  Modernity, for Bataille, is characterised by 
numerous contradictory impulses: 
There is in nature and there subsists in man a movement which always exceeds the bounds, that can 
never be anything but partially reduced to order.  We are generally unable to grasp it.  Indeed it is by 
definition that which can never be grasped, but we are conscious of being in its power: the universe that 
bears us along answers no purpose that reason defines, and if we try to make it answer to God, all we 
are doing is associating irrationally the infinite excess in the presence of which our reason exists within 
reason itself…In the domain of our life excess manifests itself in so far as violence wins over reason.  
Work demands…rational behaviour where the wild impulses worked out on feast days and usually in 
games are frowned upon.  If we were unable to repress these impulses we would not be able to work, 
but work introduces the very reason for repressing them…Most of the time work is the concern of men 
acting collectively and during the time reserved for work the collective has to oppose those contagious 
impulses to excess in which nothing is left but the immediate surrender to excess, to violence, that is.  
Hence the human collective, partly dedicated to work, is defined by taboos without which it would not 
have become the world of work that it essentially is (in Richardson, 1998:90-91). 
 
Modernity, then, never has been that which we like to think – rational, orderly and so 
on.  We delude ourselves if we think so, we delude ourselves by repression and we 
deny the manifest signs of excess in all its forms.  We are not here endorsing such a 
view, but we find it odd that such an anti-foundational epistemology is used to 
support a foundational ontology. This, in our view, is a major question that 
Hallsworth needs to address in order to sustain his position.  If modernity cannot be 
characterised along the lines Hallsworth proposes, then what is postmodern about the 
present?  And if the excesses of the present are the excesses of modernity, again, how 




We have sought to demonstrate that Hallsworth's innovative approach to 
understanding contemporary change in penal practice has still some questions to 
address before the claim he wishes to make can be sustained.  We have pointed to 
methodological, evidential and conceptual issues that pose numerous problems for 
analysing contemporary penal practices within a modern-postmodern framework.  
The questions we raise and problems we point to are not only relevant to Hallsworth’s 
argument, for they bedevil all varieties of ‘post’ arguments – post-Fordism, post-
industrialism, information society and so on – that seek to establish radical ruptures 
with a past.  Although lacking a clear causal mechanism of change and a final end-
state to historical development, such theories retain the 'familiar evolutionary 
typology' found in social theory, particularly in its sociological manifestations, that 
has a long pedigree. As Kumar (1995:13) points out in relation to information society 
theses, 'current changes are seen according to a model derived from (assumed) past 
changes, and future developments are projected following the logic of the model.  So 
just as industrial society replaced agrarian society, the information society is replacing 
industrial society, more or less in the same evolutionary way.'  Such a model of 
change, one which underpins not only 'information society' but also most 
postindustrial theories, suffers from attributing characteristics of change to 
contemporary developments, where it has been, according to Kumar, (1995:18) 
‘plausibly argued that recent trends are manifestations of a profound change in 
industrial societies that took place over a century ago’. In short, these various 
criticisms suggest that the conception of a radical break in social development is 
greatly overstated, its evolutionary underpinnings over-estimating the degree and 
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mechanisms of change.  It may therefore be the case that continuity not change is 
what characterises contemporary societies.  This is particularly pertinent for those 
who investigate the contemporary governance of capitalist relations. 
For example, the increase in incarceration noted by Hallsworth is evident in 
those countries that have embraced privatised forms of public provision.  Oppositional 
movements that track what is known as ‘the prison industry – capitalist punishment’, 
report the situation in the United States with particular concern. According to 
Silverstein (1997:1) the Corrections Corporation of America has seen its stock market 
value steadily increase throughout the 1990s, with an 81% rise in revenue in 1995.  
Another private prison contractor, Esmor, saw a rise in revenue from $4.6 million in 
1990 to over $25 million in 1995.  To maintain profits and growth, not only are more 
(private) prisons being built, but they must also be filled.  Prisoners become the raw 
production material for a number of private enterprises then run within the prisons, so 
that Wright (1997) points out that private companies have contracted with at least 
twenty five US states to start up enterprises inside prisons to take advantage of 
already existing facilities and low-wage, non-union labour.  As has been the case 
throughout the history of imprisonment in the USA, the majority of prisoners are from 
minority ethnic groups.  The point is, that the increase in incarceration could be 
understood as simply the extension of neo-liberal governance and capitalist 
commodity relations. 
It can be argued that the techniques and technologies of production may 
change, but capitalist societies remain organised around the same principles and 
objectives as always. Kumar (1995:194) suggests the issue of capitalism and 
postmodernity remains a central question of contemporary social theory.  Given these 
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methodological, empirical and conceptual lacunae, we suggest that a convincing case 
for a ‘postmodern penality’ has not been made 
Bibliography 
Crook, S., Pakulski, J., and Waters, M. (1992) Postmodernization: Change in 
Advanced Society. London:Sage 
 
Dickens,D.R. and Fontana, A. (eds) (1994) Postmodernism and Social Inquiry. 
London: UCL Press 
 
 Esping-Andersen, G, (1990), The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism  
Cambridge: Polity/ Oxford :Blackwell 
  
Hallsworth, S. (2002) ‘The case for a postmodern penality’, Theoretical Criminology 
vol 6(2):145-163 
 
Kellner, D. (1989) Jean Baudrillard. From Marxism to Postmodernism and Beyond. 
Cambridge: Polity 
 
Kumer, K.K. (1995) From Post-Industrial to Post-Modern Society.  New Theories of 
the Contemporary World. Oxford: Blackwell 
 
Larsson, A. (1998) ’European social model – social dialogue. New challenges: global 
economy, enlargement’.  Speech to the Austrian Presidency Conference 9-10 
November, Vienna. http://www.europa/eu.int/comm/dg05/speechesp1 
 
Lash, S. (1999) Another Modernity. A Different Rationality. Oxford: Blackwell 
Latour, B. (1993) 
 
McClintock, A. (1995) Imperial Leather. Race, Gender and Sexuality in the Colonial 
Contest. London: Routledge 
 
McGrew, A. (1992) ‘The State in Advanced Capitalist Societies’ in Allen, J., Braham, 
P. and Lewis, P. (eds) Political and Economic Forms of Modernity. Cambridge: 
Polity/Open University 
 
O’Brien, M. and Penna, S. Theorising Welfare.  Enlightenment and Modern Society. 
London: Sage 
 
Offe, C. (1984) Contradictions of the Welfare State. London: Hutchinson. 
 
Penna, S., O’Brien, M., and Hay, C. (1999) ‘Introduction’, in O’Brien, M., Penna, S. 
and Hay, C. (eds) Theorising Modernity. Reflexivity, Environment and Identity in 
Giddens’ Social Theory. London: Longman 
 
Pinch, S. (1997) Worlds of Welfare. London: Routledge 
 
Reiner, R. (2000)  ‘Crime and Control in Britain’, Sociology, vol.34, no.3, pp. 71-94 
 20 
 
Richardson, M. (Ed) (1998) Georges Bataille - Essential Writings. London:Sage 
Silverstein, K. (1997) ‘America’s Private Gulag’, Prison Legal News, June. 
http://www.igc.org/trac/feature/prisons/gulag.html 
 
Taylor, I. (1999) Crime in Context. A Critical Criminology of Market Societies. 
Cambridge:Polity 
 
Turner, B.S.  (1990) ‘Periodization and Politics in the Postmodern’, in Turner, B.S. 
(ed) Theories of Modernity and Postmodernity. London:Sage 
 
Wright, P. (1997) ‘Profiting From Punishment’,. Prison Labour News, March. 
http://www.igc.org/trac/feature/prisons/labour.html 
 
 
 
 
